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Abstract: 
First, the statistical evidence on FDI in the Central and Eastern European countries is shown. The 
volume of investment, the trends of capital inflow according to countries of destination and origin, and the 
distribution among industries are discussed. The main observations are the following : the volume of 
investment remained below the expected amount, Hungary attracted almost half of the investment over the 
whole period, whereas the Czech Republic got only the early investment. The foreign capital inflow seems to 
be diverted in time from the (North)-West part earlier towards the South-Eastern part of the region more 
recently. As far as the pattern of countries of origin is concerned, Germany is leading, followed by the US 
and Austria. The Far East is almost absent. As far as the industry pattern is concerned it is a far cry from the 
typical picture of industries which are characterised by early and a large amount of FDI. 
Some descriptive analysis was done on a pioneer sample of the 400 major international investors 
in the Visegrad-3 countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Investor country, industry and 
company determinants of foreign direct investment are dealt with. There seems to be an advantage of being 
near to the market, in particular for German and Austrian small to medium-sized companies. There is some 
interesting evidence about the role of intangible assets such as advertising and R&D, as most of the 
investment projects seem to be characterised by a low use of these intangible assets, but this seems to be 
compensated by the major investment deals which take place in industries which loyally advertise and do 
research. The size effect is not clear, but the sample of investors was biased towards larger projects. This 
puts forward some further hypotheses to investigate on whether the presence in the East is explained by 
market or low cost considerations and seen in a long term rather than in a short term perspective. 
Finally, this paper provides an overview of the theories on foreign direct investment behaviour by 
multinational companies. The different strands of this literature originating in international business, 
industrial organisation, location theory and the theory of the firm models are briefly mentioned. The 
emphasis is on the more recent analytical models of strategic behaviour, and, given the idiosyncrasies of 
the situation in Central and Eastern Europe as countries of destination of the foreign capital inflow, four 
major game theoretic related ways of analysis are expounded upon and criticised in the way they are 
inadequate to analyse FDI in the CEECs. These frameworks are: entry deterrence, waiting under uncertainty 
and learning from it, strategic trade policy and delocalisation. From this a tentative integration is suggested . 
• This work is part of the Ph.D. thesis of the author, which is financially supported by the N.F.W.O. 
(Belgian National Fund of Scientific Research). We would above all like to thank R. Veugelers and J. 
Konings. Also the help by the other members of the author's transfer committee, R. De Bondt, S. Estrin, 
M. Jackson and L. Sleuwaegen through very helpful encouraging comments is gratefully acknowledged, 
as well as the suggestions on empirical sources by K. Meyer and on analytical modelling by S. Vannini. 
All errors and fallacies remain ours. Comments of any kind are very welcome. 
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Introduction 
If one studies FDI, one puts oneself in the tradition of a huge number of piSvious 
researchers who studied (strategic) decision making by multinational companies. If one 
focuses on Central and Eastern Europe, however, history is equal to the present and empirical 
research depends on interpretation of only recently available data, which grow simultaneously 
with research on them. We need to explain concepts that statistical evidence are based upon, 
before daring to use the data to avoid walking in an ambush. The basic conditions of 
capitalism are only observed in an embryonic stage, and capitalism will not show itself from its 
best side. The number of hypotheses one can formulate is enormous, since the uncertainty is 
high and experience not a factor in explaining personal (investment) decisions this time, at 
first sight. Who will go to the East? What are their motivations? How do competitors react or 
counteract? Which contribution will the capital inflow make to the badly needed restructuring 
of the host economy ? All this is a good pretext to illustrate what empirical industrial 
organisation, as it stands now, can explain and perhaps can not. The rather unusual structure 
of the explanation, whereby we show the data first and then go on to theory is chosen on 
purpose and inspired by the need for exploratory research as a prerequisite for modelling. The 
scientifically and culturally educational value of tackling these questions seems very 
challenging, in any case. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE ON FDIIN THE CEECS 
1.1. The volume of investment 
The aggregate data per investor country were provided by the Central Banks of all the 
investor countries. It is worthwile to perform an analysis. This is bound to be purely 
descriptive, but a first prerequisite for further studying. We explain the concepts that the data 
are based upon and reconcile the interpretation of the patterns that come out of these data 1, 
certainly the aggregate figures. The data we use are generally based on the balance of 
payments concept. The disadvantage of Central Bank balance of payments data is that they 
merely reflect cash payments through banks without taking in-kind transfers, transfers of 
technology and other intangible assets beside projects financed in the investor's capital 
market into account. Most Central Banks, though, complete these financial flow data by a 
survey they collect from the investors themselves. This method is not completely generalised, 
since, first of all, the benchmark2 of required equity participation for foreign direct investment 
is not uniform across countries. Second, the minimum size of the investment project may be 
stipulated differently. Third, the coverage of the surveys is not complete, and the response 
rates are in the order of 90% (Sveriges Riksbank, e.g.), which means that there often is an 
observed surplus of outward investment (of 35.8%, e.g. for Sweden) for the investor 
countries. 
Before 1990, there was very little foreign direct investment in the historically planned 
economies. The existing investments went mainly to Poland, Hungary and the former 
Yugoslavia3 • After 1989, the total foreign direct investment inflow in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
I See, in view of this, also the latest ACE-report on the topic, Rojec et al. (1995). 
2The IMF balance of payments yearbook requires a benchmark of 10%, which is the rule in most OECD 
countries. This is the case for the Belgian Nationale Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Osterreichische 
Nationalbank, the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi, the Sveriges Riksbank, The Suomen Pankki, The Banco 
de Espana, The Danmarks National bank, The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
Schweizerische Nationalbank. The Deutsche Bundesbank, though, has a benchmark of 20%. The 
Nederlandse Bank has no benchmark at all. The Finnish National Bank (Suomen Pankki) deviates from 
the IMF directives by not including trade credits and debt securities and by not considering 
construction, exploration and mobile equipment as FDI branches. 
3There is evidence of early investment in the Soviet Union as well during that period. 
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and Slovenia, steadily increased from 1,319 million DM4 in 1990 to 7,490 million by the end of 
1994. Whereas Dunning (1993) had forecasted an average inflow of 10 billion $ (10,6 billion 
DM5) a year until the year 2000, the actual evidence falls far behind this projection. 
Nevertheless economic growth in the region is reasonably high. The role which foreign direct 
investment does not fulfill might be partly replaced by other inflows, such as technology 
transfers, which are more difficult to measure in a consistent way. 
1.2. The countries of destination 
As far as the aggregate data are concerned, we would like to analyse the trend in the 
relative investment inflow towards the different countries of destination in Central and Eastern 
Europe (see table 1 and figure 1 in the appendix), to ask ourselves whether the countries are 
competitors among each other6 and whether the more advanced countries can be used for a 
prediction of the development in the less advanced countries. 
Hungary has each year the best record in attracting FDI during the whole period. In 
1992, its inflow amounts to 42% of the total for the CEECs already, while the Czech Republic 
manages also to increase its share that same year to 31 % and Poland has 19%. By the end of 
1993, Hungary becomes the benefitor of almost half of the inflow of FDI in the region, although 
Poland also further increases its FDI to 36% of the CEEC total, while, by then, the role of the 
Czech Republic in attracting FDI is definitely lost. Its stake is being reduced to 10% of the total 
capital inflow. 
This interesting phenomenon of a major downfall of incoming investment in the Czech 
Republic can partly be explained by the different privatisation system in the Czech Republic, 
the voucher system, which inhibited major sales to foreigners. Taking a closer look into the 
composition of the foreign capital inflow in the Czech Republic in 1993 compared to 1992, one 
indeed remarks that, whereas portfolio investments do not appear until 1992, they amount to 
495 million DM or 10% of total foreign capital inflow in 1993. Simultaneously, foreign direct 
investments decrease their share in total foreign capital from 1716 million DM or 50% of total 
capital inflow in 1992 to 990 million DM or 20% of the total only in 1993 (see figure 2 in the 
appendix). 
A recent striking evolution is the swing of foreign direct investment in Romania in 
1994, which is probably due to some large deals which were concluded by R.J. Reynolds (65 
million DM), Kraft Jacobs Suchard (35 million DM) and Daewoo (253 million DM). From a 
virtual absence of FDI in the country before, it obtained 15% of incoming investment in that 
year. This trend is expected to continue through 1995 with again big entries by British 
American Tobacco, Procter and Gamble, Unilever, Amoco and Efes Pilsen for a total amount 
of 470 million DM (Central European Economic Review, Dec.95-Jan.96). The Romanian trend 
is, to a lesser extent, also followed in Slovakia, which suffered from the separation from the 
Czech Republic in 1993 and even before. In 1994 it manages to obtain nevertheless already 
4% of the foreign capital inflow. Meanwhile Bulgaria also manages to divert 7% of the inflow to 
its domestic economy, compared to a poor 1 % in 1993. 
It seems that, whereas the relatively larger inflows of foreign capital since 1994 go to 
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, the less advanced countries in the region, the Czech, 
Hungarian and Polish stake in the capital inflow in 1994 is reduced to 9%, 35% and 30%, 
respectively. The experience in the earlier transition period of the latter countries could be a 
4All amounts will be given in DM, because of the relative stability of the currencies o"f the investor 
countries vis-a-vis this currency. The rate of the US$ is very volatile since the mid-1980s and we do not 
want to include these t1uctuations in the mainly European currency investment figures. 
5The exchange rates were calculated on the time series provided by DATASTREAM (August 1995). 
6This is along the same lines as or could be linked to the leader-follower phenomenon or herd effect we 
described in Part L2.2 .. We will formulate the hypothesis that some companies follow each other but try 
to avoid competition by each other by localising in a different country of the CEECs' region and ask 
ourselves to what an extent the entry encouraging policies of the respective governments playa role in 
this. 
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predictor of what will happen in the former part of the region. Ideally, one needs to compare 
the foreign direct investment per capita or per GOP of the countries of destination. 
1.3. The countries of origin 
We investigate the distribution of the investment over the investor countries based on 
the balance of payments data of the major investor countries and its evolution over the time 
period 1990-1994 (figure 3 in the appendix). Then, we show the relative importance of each of 
the three Visegrad countries for the investor countries (table 2 in the appendix). 
The undeniable major investor is Germany, with inflows of 217 million OM in 1990 to 
2,2 billion OM in 1994. The increase in the foreign capital outflow, which was spectacular in 
the beginning period of 1990-1991, since then seems to justify itself at a constant level. As far 
as Germany's country preferences are concerned, its investment in Hungary has an average 
share of 53%, which is much larger than the 35% in the Czech Republic and the 12% in 
Poland. In the beginning period of 1990-1991 major deals seem to be closed with the Czech 
Republic, which we can indeed find back in the coverage by the enterprises concerned? 
Second to this in amount invested and also later in time, with a strong upswing in 
1993, are the US investments, which amount to nearly 23 million OM in 1990, and increase to 
229 million OM in 1991, to reach 1,6 billion OM in 1994 alone. The majority of the investment 
is again going to Hungary, and this even more outspoken than for Germany. The Czech 
Republic is typical German territory, as the data would suggest. American investment in the 
region took also off later, only since 1993. 
The position of Austria is in the longer run important, but there are major contrasts 
between the earlier years until 1992, where it was the second or possibly third (because of 
some UK investment) largest investor after Germany, and the moderate efforts from 1993 
onwards (when there is a boom in American investment). We lack capital outflows from 
Austria to Poland, which was confirmed to be very small (an average of 4% of the Visegrad 
total), though, by the Austrian National Banks. It might be the case that Austria is a relatively 
larger investor when one takes all the Central and Eastern European countries together, 
beside these three Visegrad countries. Comparing Hungary and the Czech Republic as a 
destination, there is a clear surplus of Austro-Hungarian investment projects over Austro-
Czech combinations. 
The UK seems to have only a minor interest in the region, except in the beginning 
period. We must be very careful here because data for 1993 and 1994 were not available yet! 
It might, however, have an explanation in the fact that is will be comparable to its investment 
pattern in Western Europe, which is, compared to, e.g., German investment, also much 
smaller than its investment in the US and the Commonwealth. It will be interesting to see 
whether the British interest continues to weaken or not. Just like for the other investor 
countries, the preference for Hungary is again visible, with a small surplus of British-Polish 
over British-Czech ventures. 
Belgium has a relative strong increase of its investment in the region, showing an 
inflow of foreign capital of 178 million OM in 1991, which was six times more than in 1990. In 
1992, however, the investment decreased to recover again in 1993. Belgian investment 
amounts seem to depend very much on its involvement in deals in Hungary, which is maybe 
over since 1994, where the share of Belgian investment in Hungary suddenly drops from 54% 
to 22%. This might have turned the investment interest of Belgium towards opportunities in the 
larger neighbour Poland. 
7 We prefer not to go into detail here and mention names and amounts of major investors, since this 
will become more qualified by our stage 2 questionnaire results. 
8 We would like to explore the reasoning that Austria does not have the same historical and cultural 
relationship with Poland, which it obviously does have with Hungary and the Czech (and Slovak) 
Republic. 
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The Dutch investments become comparable to the Austrian investments, in the order 
of magnitude, from 1992 onwards, which is remarkable. Unlike most of the other investors, the 
majority of the Dutch investment goes to Poland in the recent years, to the detriment of 
Hungarian ventures. Overall, however, the Hungarian surplus manifests itself also here. 
Relatively moderate are the investment projects by Italian, Danish, Swiss (missing 
outsplit to the Visegrad countries only, because of a lack of collection of these data), Spanish 
and Finnish investments. The latter investor country is much more active in the Baltic region 
and in the neighbouring republics of the former Soviet Union. The Italian investment is equally 
spread among the three Visegrad countries, the Danish are less present in the Czech 
Republic, a fact which is equally valid for the Swiss and the Finnish. There seems to be a 
tendency of investment diverted more and more towards Poland for these countries. 
Japanese investments are hardly existing, and this also goes for other investment 
from the Far East, as case evidence tells us. If at all present, Japanese investors go to 
Hungary, which is utmost clear. 
Given these tendencies, it would be interesting if we were able to relate this pattern of 
investments by countries as Germany and Austria to the investigation of the effect of being 
near to the market in part 11.1.2. The same goes, to a lesser extent for Central Europe, but 
clearly for the Baltic area being near to Poland and Finland. 
1.4. The industries of investment 
The industry distribution is not as accurately covered for every country. Hence, in 
order to be comparable, we need to put up with the least disaggregated data for the 
comparison of investments towards the three Visegrad countries the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. It is striking that the appearance of foreign direct investment is not in what we 
from experience would label as the traditional sectors of early investment in a region, such as 
the petroleum industry, iron and steel, chemicals, mining, automobiles and electrical 
appliances. On a global scale, these are the typical industries in which FDI takes place 
(Dunning (1993)). One could consider these industries to be more characterised by ownership 
and scale advantages than by any local market-related consideration. 
What we see, on the contrary, happening in Eastern Europe does not fall in line with 
this distribution (see figures 4a, 4b, 4c and table 3). First, there is the appearance of very 
locally determined services such as banks and insurance and hotels and restaurants. 
Transportation equipment is important as are real estate and construction. The food and 
beverage industry is also dominant and is, once more, characterised by a need for adaptation 
to the local market. This conclusion of non-traditional types of FDI as far as the industry 
distribution is concerned is very interesting and invites further exploration. 
On our research agenda is a consideration of the type of investment, as the way of 
entry being acquisition or greenfield, beside the role of the investment in the privatisation 
process, its organisational form Goint ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries) and the capital 
participation. It is, however, easier to say something useful on this on the company data, since 
the aggregate country statistics provide no satisfying and even mixed evidence on this. 
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II. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF OUR EMPIRICAL WORK: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
OF OUR PIONEER SAMPLE AND SUGGESTED REFINEMENTS 
The analysis we did is not the test of any empirical model yet, but it will prove to be 
very helpful to use the descriptive statistics to get an understanding of the patterns of the 
variables which are identified in the theoretical models of international business, industrial 
organization, location theory and the theory of the firm to affect the investment decisions of 
multinational corporations (Part III). We can link this with the aggregate statistical evidence we 
have provided a concise overview of (Part I). We briefly describe the patterns we distinguished 
in our sample, thereby distinguishing between country, industry, and firm characteristics we 
possess yet. We label this stage 1. We will explain the idiosyncrasies we experience when 
imposing an adequate theoretical analysis of FDI in the CEECs and finally add some 
refinements to be made for our stage 2 analysis on our broader survel. 
We intend to analyse the results of the broad survey using the collected panel data. 
Starting from both the descriptive analysis 10 of the pioneer sample of MNEs and the Finnish 
study of the completer set of investment determining factors, we specify how this will refine 
our methodology and possibilities of testing, as will be expounded in part III. The company 
data we used in stage 1, which we cover now, were provided by the foreign trade associations 
of the investor countries, the industry level investment inflows by the privatisation agencies, 
economic ministries and national banks of the Visegrad countries themselves. 
Beside the host country variables, the home country (country of origin) of the investor 
definitely plays a role. The largest number of investment projects comes from Germany, 
Austria and the U.S. The historical links through trade relationships, historical migration and 
donations from these countries might continue to play its part. 
11.1. Descriptive statistics of our pioneer sample 
11.1.1. Investment country patterns of our pioneer sample 
Since we preliminary provide data on three investment countries only, namely the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, we consider it to be premature to jump to conclusions 
about investment country patterns. We assume that a larger market size (local consumption 
potential, for which a good estimate must be found) encourages foreign direct investment, 
c.p.. Among the largest investors we have data on, investments in Poland are 
overrepresented, which is in line with the population of this country, which is four times as 
large as the number of inhabitants of the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
As far as host country variables are concerned, the growth rates of industrial 
production per country, the growth rate of GOP, the population per country and the GNP 
per capita need to be investigated over time. In order to consider a causal relationship, to 
which we can come back in our later analysis of the investment projects over time, one ideally 
refers to GNP per capita. This also goes for data we provide on the distribution of investments 
according to countries (home and host countries). To really investigate the intensity of 
investment patterns which are country specific, one needs each time to reinterpret data 
accurately, taking the size of the host country into account. Among the about 400 major 
investors we analyse 74% of the investment projects of our sample are executed in Poland, 
15% in the Czech Republic and 11 % in Hungary, which is in line with the order of magnitude 
of the population sizes of these countries. This is to say that every host country variable we 
use needs to be corrected for the market size of the particular host country. 
9 This analysis is currently in preparation and will be carried out in Winter 1995-1996 and analysed 
subsequently. In a preliminary survey sent to thirty Finnish investors, we tried to get this information we 
will analyse in the final database and it proved encouraging. Since the sample of these thirty enterprises 
is largely biased, we can not derive overall conclusions from it. 
IOThe analysis was carried out in STATA, v.4. 
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Beside investment country (host country) patterns, the home country of the investor 
plays a part. Austria, Germany and the U.S. are the major investors, which might be 
explained by the historical trade relationships and migration of a considerable part of the 
Central and Eastern European population towards these countries11 • The average investment 
per country of origin is calculated and shown in figure 8. 
High transportation costs or, more precisely, weight to value ratios, encourage 
foreign direct investments. We include distance, i.e. the air distance between the capitals of 
investor/home and investment/host country as a proxy to test the hypothesis that the fact of 
being near to the market plays a role, keeping in mind the debatable point of view that 
distance is not exactly the same as dealing with differentiated transportation costs. Naujoks, 
Schmidt (1995) found clear evidence of a positive influence of geographical nearness despite 
globalisation. As the scatter plot illustrates, the analysis of the pioneer sample leads to the 
conclusion that the majority of the investments are low distance projects. The largest 
investment projects also typically appear at low distance. This is a general tendency in the 
three Visegrad countries studied. We would like to link this in future analysis with a 
differentiated picture of the cultural linkage of the nearer investor countries. 
11.1.2. Industry patterns of our pioneer sample 
The following industries proved to be the major investors. According to the value of 
their investments, the top five investor industries are: 
1. motor vehicles 
2. financial intermediation 
3. chemicals 
4. food and beverages 
5. communication equipment. 
In number of investment projects, the ranking is as follows, including partly the same 
industries: 
1.food and beverages 
2.construction 
3.financial intermediation 
4.non-metallic mineral products (glass, ceramics, cement, concrete) 
5.chemicals. 
Some industries possess characteristics which favour multinational production. These 
are industry characteristics in general and in the host country. We hypothesise that R&D 
intensive industries are more likely to invest abroad. This is part of Hymer's intangible assets' 
model where he predicts that firms with intangible assets in general, to which advertising 
intensity and brand name belong as well, are more inclined to invest. Grubaugh (1987) 
obtained the result that R&D and advertising intensive industries are more inclined to invest. 
We adopted the classification developed by Lyons, Davies (1995), distinguishing 
between four types of industries: those with both low advertising and low R&D (type 1), those 
which either have a high advertising (type 2) or a high R&D (type 3) intensity and, finally, those 
with both high advertising and high R&D (type 4). 
A striking feature is that the value of investments is concentrated among type 4 
industries (see figure 5), which is consistent with the 'intangible assets' hypothesis. We 
showed already which industries these are. The largest investments take place in the same 
industries. These large investments are mainly undertaken by British, Austrian, Italian, 
German and US firms. By simply looking to the number of investment projects this tendency is 
not confirmed. It is, on the contrary, the case that the majority of the investment projects 
(38%) is situated in the low advertising and low R&D industries. There seems to be a small 
dominance of advertising intensive over R&D intensive investment projects, which amount to 
11 These cultural or differentiated sense of nationhood related determinants of FDI in the region are the 
topic of a separate paper which was submitted for the EBEN (European Business Ethics Network) 
Conference on management across cultures. 
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27% and 19% respectively of total investment projects. The highly advertising and R&D 
intensive industries represent 16% of the investment projects. The distribution of investments 
according to countries of origin for our sample is depicted in figures 6 and 7.The amount of 
total investments according to the different industries is represented in figure 9 in the 
appendix. The average investment per industry is shown in figure 10. The ranking confirms 
the difference in R&D and advertising patterns between number of investment projects and 
their corresponding value. We insist on the importance of looking to the value of the 
investment projects. Although a minority of investments being substantial, the average size of 
the investment projects of our sample was 76,900,000 OM. The evidence concerning the 
relevance of advertising and R&D intensity for foreign direct investment might be reconsidered 
once company level data on advertising and R&D expenditures become available via our 
survey. 
11.1.3. Firm characteristic patterns of our pioneer sample 
We forbear forecasting what will be the influence of the size of the investing firm 
(measured by its employment) on the amount of its investments in the V-3 countries. Since 
this first sample provides us with the about 400 largest investors in the 3 Visegrad countries, it 
is very likely that the investing enterprises of a large size are overrepresented. The literature in 
general is hesitating to proclaim an outspoken positive size effect. Horst (1972) obtained the 
result that firm size is the only firm characteristic to positively influence the decision of a MNE 
to invest abroad. We could make a footnote here. 
11.2 The idiosyncrasies of research on FDI in Central and Eastern Europe and 
remarks and refinements to be made in the broader survey 
11.2.1 The idiosyncrasies of research on FDI in Central and Eastern Europe 
As far as the statistical evidence and the supplementary analysis we did allows us, we 
can conclude, in view of the theoretical work we will derive from this, some very fundamental 
idiosyncrasies for anyone who intends to do research on foreign direct investment in the 
context of the CEECs. We think in terms of particular determinants which one does not come 
across in traditional theoretical FDI models. 
Among the most crucial influencing factors are the large uncertainty under which this 
investment process must take place. Beside there is the political risk which is endogenous to 
most of the regimes of this region. Entry takes place, but the products offered are, in general, 
hardly comparable to the products offered by incumbent producers locally. This supports our 
point, which we will later elaborate on, that it is advisable to focus on competition between 
entrants instead of competition between one entrant and an incumbent, as is mostly analysed 
in the traditional entry literature. 
Beside and on top of the former determinants, we would stress not to underestimate 
the peculiarities of the countries themselves. Wages are lower than in the countries of origin 
of the investment. This questions whether there will be a surplus of labour-intensive 
investments taking place. Natural resources in these countries are abundant, which is 
clearly in contrast to some other investment regions. Market entry in the, mainly OECD, 
investor countries is, seen on a global scale, restricted everywhere by non-tariff barriers, the 
Multifiber Agreement and the like. This makes one argue about the effect of the relative 
openness of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in this respect. There is, 
undoubtedly, a high preference in this region for Western goods, which helps to turn it in a 
potential market. 
The reason why we consider it to be important to stress the particular side effects and 
determinants of FDI in the region is related to our interest in the role which FDI could play in 
the region. FDI can play an important role in the privatisation of the whole structure of industry, 
trade and agriculture. It does more than that, since it also favours restructuring, either before 
or after privatisation. Portfolio investment was barely existing in the beginning of transition 
and, although this is slightly changing, it remains the case that one could ask oneself whether 
FDI is not the logical alternative to have a stake in the comparatively very high growth of the 
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CEECs. The lending capacities of these countries on the international market are, moreover, 
very restricted. 
On top of this, we think of FOI as enhancing marketing and organisation, which is 
necessary for the transition and the restructuring process. The industry structure could also 
become less concentrated. Banks used to have virtually inexistant control over firms, a 
situation foreign investments by foreign or domestic banks could overturn. Hard currency is 
badly needed in the case of an export promotion policy, and, on the other hand, FOI remains a 
way to keep scarce foreign currency when the main policy is characterised by import 
substitution aspirations. 
11.2.2 Remarks and refinements to be made in the broader survey 
It is self-evident that the refinements we propose are inspired by the modelling as it 
will be suggested in 111.2. Some of the determinants we explain now are not readily available. 
We introduced them in the broader survey which will be sent out. First, several country 
dummies need to be added. GNP growth rates could be compared to an average of OECD 
growth rates. The level of language education could be ranked among the host countries 
and compared to the level of the investor countries. Tariffs per country and per broad 
category of industry give an insight into the international trade aspects of the decisions taken 
by MNEs. 
Some hypotheses concerning the cultural, mainly historically explainable, 
linkages could be estimated by taking the language taught at secondary school in the host 
country, to approximate the ease of integration for the labour force and management of the 
acquired or newly established investments. An interesting phenomenon to explore is also the 
number of expatriates from long time ago who are present in the investing firms. These socio-
cultural determinants of investment in the CEECs are only analysable if one compares the 
experiences of investment by the same company in another region, e.g. in Western Europe, 
with the investment climate in the CEECs. Migration patterns from the interwar era can be 
linked to the regions from which investment streams are coming, since there might be a 
striking link between the regions in, e.g., the United States, where the investors come from 
and the particular regions in Central and Eastern Europe where they mainly invest12. 
Finally, since the host country (mainly investment policy) variables, such as 
advancement in transition (marketisation) and adequacy of regulation are, despite the focus 
on them in part of the theoretical literature, shown not to be the main motivation to invest in 
the CEECs, one could introduce them anyway. It is a well documented topic, though not very 
quantifiable. 
An important aspect of the host country is its market size which influence must be 
investigated as far as the extent is concerned to which it plays a role in the investment 
decision. Whether markets are national or regarded as regional will influence this measure13• 
Second, the purpose is to gain in originality by introducing more industry specific 
characteristics. Since we did not possess the same degree of refinement for intensity of 
physical capital as in our industry delineation for R&D and advertising intensity, we could not 
yet but need to analyse the correlation of foreign direct investment with the capital intensity 
of the investor's industry. Physical capital engenders scale economies which can be better 
exploited by multinational production. The positive impact of capital intensity on investments is 
not always confirmed (Pfaffermayr (1995), Veugelers(1993)). 
As soon as we can exploit our full sample we can deal with oligopolistic industries, for 
which we can test whether the aspiration to keep a strategic balance plays a role in 
stimulating foreign direct investment. This is the strategic motive of the following-the-Ieader or 
12 This idea will be developed in a separate paper on socio-cultural and personal determinants of 
foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe. 
13 see also III.2.3. on strategic trade policy where we explain how Norman, Motta (1993) model the 
relationship between market integration and FDI. 
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herd effect (Knickerbocker (1973}). We hypothesise that we can derive this concentration 
pattern by looking into the stability of the ranking of the foreign investors over countries first, 
and over the time period we are able to scrutinise next. 
Third, as far as firm specific characteristics are concerned, we will correlate the 
investments and the export intensity of the investing firm before and since the investment 
took place. This will give us an insight in the complementarity or substitution effect of the 
investor's exports in time. It is undoubtful that there is a causal relationship in both directions. 
The internalisation theory would predict exports to diminish as soon as foreign direct 
investments are undertaken. It is questionable, though, whether this relationship will be 
uniform across industries, first. Second, the kind of exports might be different in time. FOI 
might have replaced intraindustry trade while simultaneously causing intrafirm trade (trade in 
raw materials and intermediate goods). Our export figures do not adequately disclose this 
difference. Naujoks, Schmidt (1995) cautiously provide evidence of complementarity rather 
than substitution between the two-way trade (exports and imports) and FOI. An empirical 
model applied to the Japanese electronics investments in Europe in Belderbos, Sleuwaegen 
(1995) provides evidence of greenfield FOI which negatively influences the level of the 
Japanese exports to Europe. This points to a substitution relationship. 
We provide some additional characteristics of the database for the stage two analysis 
we provide of. Since the firms in our database have been made available by the CEECs' 
authorities and by the institutions in the investor countries, the sample is not limited to the 
major investor countries. We included all possible investor countries to provide an as 
unbiased as possible picture and an as representative as possible sample. 
Since there is a lot of evidence that the majority of the investment (60%) takes place 
in the Visegrad countries and since this is at the same time the region where the investment 
took place in the earliest stage, our study is confined to the foreign direct investment in the 
Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland, which we labelled Visegrad-4 countries. 
The book value of the flow of foreign direct investments in the Visegrad-4 countries is 
available for the major industries over 5 years. As a measure of FOI the book value must 
necessarily be taken, although it has the disadvantages of offering no correction for 
depreciation and assuming equal exchange risks across industries. As pay-offs of the MNEs 
which entered we can easily find the market shares the entrants obtained, since we gather 
their export sales per market. As a supplement to the firm level data we obtained from the 
official sources, we need to ask the investing firms specifically about the exact timing of their 
investments, which is one of the major reasons for setting up the questionnaire. 
Unlike some other studies we did not limit ourselves to collect only investments in the 
form of wholly owned subsidiaries. We try and distinguish between all categories of 
investments: greenfield investments, privatisations and acquisitions. All ownership shares 
from joint ventures to wholly owned subsidiaries are gathered. These categories are specific 
to the CEECs, since we need to take privatisation into account as a special type of FOI, 
certainly in view of the traditional ideas one might have about entry. Empirically, we get a 
broader view of the phenomenon of foreign direct investment towards the CEECs. 
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES ON THE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR OF 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
Introduction 
The following overview of theories on the strategic behaviour of multinational 
companies is not to be considered as an exercise in repeating the traditional strands in the 
literature on multinational enterprises. Since our interest is directed towards the idiosyncrasies 
of investments in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, we will try to illustrate in what 
respect there are shortcomings in the way of analysis of existing models and explain how we 
would like to reorientate this. 
111.1 The traditional theory on the behaviour of mUltinational enterprises 
Out of the main traditional strands of literature on multinational enterprises which 
consider the in essence non-strategic FDI behaviour by multinational corporations, we 
distinguish two, as they find their origin in different fields of economics. First, the political 
economists depart from the question whether and if so to what an extent multinational 
corporations or their governments do acquire or increase their (monopolistic) market power by 
their foreign direct investments. Organisational behaviourists or "business analysts", on the 
other hand, investigate the internal decision process which gives rise to FDI. In this strand, 
the point of view is the one of the investors themselves rather than their country. Our focus will 
be the latter one, the investigation of the behavioural decision process by the multinational 
enterprise, outside the scope of the political economy. 
One could classify the modelling of FDI behaviour by MNEs as appearing within a 
macro or micro approach. We adopt the micro approach. The majority of the theorising on 
MNEs encompasses, on the contrary, the question why MNEs activate foreign investments by 
which they obtain a higher market share than a local competitor. In fact, this means that they 
mainly analyse the competition between the MNE and its local competitor as a duopolistic 
competition. It is, however, our intention to study the competition between two MNEs which 
are potential entrants, supposing that, once they entered, they obtain a monopolistic 
position 14. The key feature to illustrate becomes more and more that MNEs encompass 
strategic motives rather than that they would simply behave out of pure rational expansion 
investment incentives (Veugelers, 1995). 
The different disciplines which analyse the decision process of the multinational 
enterprise are international business, industrial organisation, location theory and the theory of 
the firm. They developed simultaneously, but with different focuses of analysis15• We describe 
the main contributions in these domains of the literature, and the evolution from mainly non-
strategic non-analytic modelling to analytic strategic modelling, which we split between part 
111.1. on the mainly non-strategic models and part 111.2. on the strategic models. 
We briefly elaborate on the major theory formulation on FDI by MNEs as it gained 
shape. The embryonic stage of the literature must probably be situated in the international 
business field with Caves (1982) and Dunning (1980). In the traditional non-strategic modelled 
part of the literature on the behaviour of multinationals, we distinguish three hypotheses 
around which most of the literature could be grouped. These hypotheses see multinationals 
differently, as capital arbitragists, as an oligopolist or as diversifiers of intangible assets. We 
explain these hypotheses and the hypotheses which are a logical consequence of them. First, 
Macdougal (1960), among others, sees a multinational as a capital arbitragist. The 
hypotheses ensuing from this are that capital intensive firms are more inclined to go 
multinational, as opposed to labour intensive ones which are characterised by a negative 
relationship. 
14 We put this more precisely in part IIL2 on our tentative model construction. There exists modelling 
on mixed oligopoly, for example, whereby the local competitors and the MNEs entering are assumed to 
maximise different objective functions, but we will dwell on this in part IIL2.5. 
15 Along with the explanation of the main contributing models, the respective disciplines in which they 
find their origin are indicated in italic. The main aspect which they proclaimed is indicated in bold. 
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Hymer (1976) defines the MNE as characterised by the possession of some 
intangible, proprietary asset, which is essentially knowledge in the broadest sense and a 
company which is operating in an oligopoly context. There is, however, a trade-off in the 
decision to go international, between exports, foreign direct investment (or foreign production, 
and simple contracting. The decision involves weighting scale economies or diseconomies of 
centralised production against set-up costs and cost economies or diseconomies (Iocational 
advantages of the foreign international production). This hypothesis involves that the decision 
to become a multinational is more typical for some industries than for others (partly confirmed 
by Grubaugh (1987)). The larger firm is more inclined to do it. Horst (1972) obtained the result 
that the size is the only factor positively influencing the FDI decision. Beside, Grubaugh (1987) 
and others hypothesise that the more its products are diversified, the more a firm is inclined to 
invest abroad. The would-be multinational operates in a specific competitive environment, 
mostly in an oligopolistic context, at home and also abroad, because the characteristic 
determinants of the multinational, the possession of the intangible, proprietary asset, has a 
tendency to lead to an oligopolistic market structure. This might lead to what Knickerbocker 
described in 1973 as a herd effect, which is the involuntary impulse coming from an oligopolist 
towards a competitor to follow the leader's investment, which we will dwell upon in part 111.2.2. 
about waiting under uncertainty and learning from it. 
The industrial policy of the possible host governments must be taken into account. 
This involves, again in the trade-off between exports and FDI, also their trade policies. Hence, 
Hymer (1976) explains FDI as a reallocation of resources by these multinational investors. 
The idea originates in the 'theory of the firm' literature (Coase (1937)) and appears also as the 
theoretical foundation of Dunning (1977) until Dunning (1993) whereby it is combined with the 
transaction cost approach (Williamsson) to formulate the intangible assets hypothesis, as in 
Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984). The hypotheses following from the intangible assets 
hypothesis are that high R&D, advertising and product diversity intensity favour the decision to 
invest abroad. What all of these models share is the relation they define between a particular 
firm characteristic and the (decision to) invest(ment) abroad. It are other traditions, which we 
explain later, which focus on location specific advantages. They are, technically, characterised 
by the comparative investigation of multinationals beside non-multinationals. As a 
consequence of this, they deal with the decision as a probability. 
Vernon (1966), in an attempt to explain the post-war upswing of American investment 
abroad, explains this as being integrated in the product life cycle, so already pointing 
towards strategic factors in an oligopoly context. In the tradition of Vernon, Knickerbocker 
(1973) emphasises that it are not only location variables that determine FDI by MNEs, but the 
strategic reaction to these location variables and to the anticipated behaviour of the 
competitors in an oligopoly. These two strands, the work of Hymer and Vernon, share the idea 
that neo-classical models of international trade, as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-Stolper 
model, lack the ability to explain international investment streams, since they assume perfect 
competition 16. The introduction of market imperfections is a prerequisite indeed. This will be 
linked to the models of imperfect competition from the industrial organisation and location 
literature. 
Other concomitant theorising on multinationals concerns internalisation advantages 
(Buckley, Casson (1985)), location theories, and those analyses which deal with the macro-
economic issues on the demand side. The latter ones are popularised by Japanese authors, 
such as Dani. 
In view of the main strands in the literature, which we briefly cited, it became the task 
of a modeller of strategic direct foreign investment to explain the causal relationship between 
a certain market imperfection and a particular advantage making FDI for the MNE profitable. 
One such theory was Dunning's so-called OLl-paradigm (1980) of ownership, localisation 
and internalisation advantages, which he also labelled an eclectic theory of the MNE, but 
16 One of the four behavioural models of part III.2 precisely indicates this by using the focus of strategic 
trade policy, whereby the tariff determination by the local government is analysed, as well as the 
possible tariff jumping behaviour by the MNEs as a natural strategic reaction to it. 
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which is, as a matter of fact, a combination of Hymer's ownership advantages with 
internalisation and location focuses. Dunning finds an explanation for all cross-border value-
adding activities in these three determinants. The ownership specific assets which are typicai 
of a particular nationality of ownership are future income generators. The location specific 
advantages can be tangible, such as cultural, legal, political and institutional factors, or 
intangible, which are technology, information, managerial, marketing or entrepreneurial skills. 
Both structural and transactional market imperfections let the enterprise decide that there 
might be an advantage to be perceived of hierarchical control, which makes internalisation 
necessary. We explain the structural and transactional market imperfection. 
In line with Hymer's insight of a structural market imperfection, Dunning concludes 
that there is a structural market imperfection first out of the inability of market organisation. 
The entry barriers which exist as a consequence of this might, for example, typically be 
overcome by acquisition, which is a form of internalisation in itself. Second, because of the 
lack of complete information about the consequences of the transactions undertaken, the 
external benefits and costs of transactions, which lead to different (the same) stages of the 
same (a different) value chain under the same governance, and because of insufficient 
demand to capture economies of size, scope, and geographical diversification, there exists a 
transactional market imperfection (theory of the firm). In all of these three aspects, the 
ownership specific, location and internalisation characteristics, the firm might possess an 
advantage vis-a.-vis other nationalities because of property rights, of greater organisational 
efficiency or simply because of the uneven distribution of resources, which gives it an 
incentive to go international. Dunning also tests this theory empirically. 
Dunning's paradigm has its advocates, but has also been the object of a lot of 
criticism ever since its diffusion, Itaki (1991), among others. Itaki is, for instance, very diffident 
about the vagueness of the delinealization of the determinants of FDI which would fall under 
the categories of ownership, localisation and internalisation. 
Based on the investors' declarations about investment incentives and deterrents in the 
region, the aspiration would be to use an as generalisable as possible model of the foreign 
direct investment behaviour of multinational corporations. The problem of this aspiration is that 
it is probably too ambitious. The ideal alternative is to rely on different aspects of the 
behaviour of multinational corporations instead, but to use the conclusions reached in the 
earlier modelling. 
The four behavioural aspects, which we distil from the previous rich literature on 
multinational enterprises' investment behaviour, taking the idiosyncrasies of investments in the 
CEECs into account, are: entry deterrence, waiting and learning, strategic trade policy and 
union-firm bargaining. We elaborate on the more traditional theories of FDI by MNEs, which 
are mainly focused on the non-strategic aspects of FDI behaviour by MNEs. It is important, 
though, to realise that the later, mainly game theoretic and international trade-inspired 
theories, which we summarise as four aspects of behaviour by MNEs in part 111.2, derive from 
the insights of these earlier theories. 
111.2 The analytical game theoretic theory on the behaviour of multinational 
companies, a tentative model construction and the idiosyncrasies of the 
empirical application to Eastern Europe 
We will now consider four partial models explaining strategic interaction between 
MNEs, with the clear aim to reconcile them to a maximal extent possible to shed some light on 
FDI by MNEs. They all share the common feature that they are strategies which can be dealt 
with by game theoretic analysis and take potential competition into account, rather than merely 
existing competition. An overview of the strategies against potential competition can be found 
in De Bondt (1984). The theories we derived from this are: entry deterrence, waiting and 
learning, strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining. We explain each concept first and 
add some reservations to apply them to the specific context of Eastern Europe, as distilled 
from the statistical evidence and empirical additional evidence of parts I and II, if this is 
necessary next. Finally, a direction is formulated towards more tentative model(s) of our own. 
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The reason why we provide these four models lays in the idiosyncrasies of the 
Eastern European context, as distilled earlier. First, entry and competition between foreign 
entrants is the reason why we need to depart but divert from the entry deterrence literature. 
Second, the endogenous political and other types of uncertainty inspires a so-called 'waiting 
and learning' framework, which was not yet applied in a game theoretic way. Third, the 
policies of the host government, which take either the form of export promotion or import 
substitution, shows the need to model the strategic trade policy of the host government 
towards the potential investors. Finally, the lower wages of the region might be used by the 
home country union or by the investor in different ways to influence the debate on the 
usefulness of delocalisation. 
111.2.1. Entry deterrence 
The extensive literature on entry deterrence provides a first suggestion for analysis. 
The majority of these models focuses on the ways in which the incumbents deter the entry of 
an outsider, in this case being the MNE. In view of our data collection and partly also due to 
the availability limits of data on local competitors, our focus is different. The purpose is to 
analyse the competition and possible entry deterring behaviour by two MNEs which consider 
entering into a new market, whereby the local competitors are supposed to produce a 
differentiated good compared to the one produced by the entrants. The entrants, on the other 
hand, operate in exactly the same market. This is different from the focus of the major part of 
the literature on entry deterrence, which models the deterrence by a competitor in the local 
market. 
The literature on entry deterrence draws on many ideas of Dixit (1980). Since 
investments involve irrecoverable and irreversible sunk costs, they can be used to exert or 
increase some market power by credibly committing to the investment which implicitly involves 
these sunk costs. Vannini's modelling (1995) in Dixit's tradition illustrates that even the 
absence of tariff barriers does not mean the necessity of an export strategy instead of FDI, 
once the possibility for early-on investments in capacity is considered by the MNE. Vannini 
shows that it are strategic motives which play to pre-empt entry by other firms. The increase in 
market power / share is balanced against the sunk costs which are implicitly linked to the 
investment. Our research question is to investigate when constellations of the post-entry 
subgame influence the behaviour of a potential entrant thus far that it succeeds in deterring 
another interested competitor from entering as well or in inhibiting him to gain a larger market 
share. 
111.2.2. Waiting under uncertainty and learning from it 
Our inspiration was the typical situation of investments in the East as the stylised facts 
we would like to base our modelling on. Something one needs to stress is that, throughout all 
these different aspects of modelling of behaviour of MNEs, we hold the belief that investors 
provide the useful information to their possible succeeding investors rather than (or to a larger 
degree than) the local host governments. Governments are less effective in informing 
potential investors. Compared to investments in the West a potential investor who is 
considering to move to the East indeed needs additional information about such aspects as 
the provision of infrastructure17, the qualification of the labour force, the quality of the 
environment, the property rights and the remote government support. This type of information 
is, in the case of the CEECs, not readily available from the future host government, because 
there is an obvious biased interest or because it is simply unknown to them. Factors that the 
local governments can play with is the amount of tariffs (part 111.3). The amount of political and 
financial support given by the government is difficult to modellize. We briefly explain the 
waiting and learning modelling first. 
The idea is that investors wait and refrain from investing while they observe the actual 
investments made. The availability of the information is an externality that the actual investors 
17 An interesting analysis of the role of infrastructure as investment promotor is given by P. Welfens 
(1995). 
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produce and do not take into account. This 'waiting and learning game', adapted from 
Thimann, Thum (1993) would be, in its simplest form, a one-shot game played in two stages. 
In the first stage, two or more foreign based MNEs would decide whether to serve the local 
market by home-country production and exports or by starting local production, either by 
building a new plant (greenfield) or by buying its / their local competitor (privatisation or 
acquisition). In the latter case it is thinkable that the firm becomes a local monopoly. In the 
second and final stage, that / those firm(s) which did not invest yet decide(s) which output to 
produce and sell. Export and foreign direct investment by the local firm in the opposite 
direction is not considered. This aspect we would like to change for a competition between two 
entrants. 
Whereas initially, the game of investing in the East was indeed seen as a one-time 
opportunity, a so-called "rat race" (Akerlof, 1976), it became clear that it did not have these 
characteristics, but was more realistically of the type of a repeated mUlti-stage static game, 
where reliable information can only be collected through other firms, which gives waiting a 
positive value (Dixit (1992)). 
Since waiting has a positive value, there are two possible outcomes. In the first case 
none of the firms invests, because the investment is not even profitable for the firm with the 
lowest thinkable set-up costs. This would be the typical case of a first mover disadvantage 
(Sutton (1991 )), since this first firm did not manage to provide itself with the infrastructure nor 
to put the necessary pressure on the local authorities. It creates, however, physical 
externalities for later investors. It could even lead to the type of situation where the investment 
as a public good has a positive value for everyone, but only the person that actually invests 
would bear the costs, the so-called "dragon slayer" problem (Bliss, Nalebuff (1984», which 
could mean that in the end no single firm invests. In the second case the investment process 
starts, but not in a socially optimal way, which is precisely the situation which is observed to 
have been occurring in the CEECs. A social planner can internalise the learning benefit from 
an additional first period project, while private investors do not consider the value of the public 
good, the information on the level of productivity in the region, which they provide by investing 
in Thimann, Thum (1993). 
The generalisability of this type of model, which we need to work out, lies in the 
assumption that out of a quite homogeneous group of potential investors (MNEs), in the same 
or a different industry, one is going to invest in the East first. Some kind of heterogeneity 
apart from the estimation of the productivity of the region is thinkable and necessary, such as 
costs compared to size, or the degree of multinationality, the attitude towards risk, the time of 
planning, the fact whether the product is low-end or high-end, the distance from the home 
market, the transportability of goods, etc. There is food for thought and imagination. In the 
end, we must find an explanation why one firm takes the decision of investing first and is 
probably more successful in it than its successors. 
Related to the modelling of the 'waiting and learning' aspect, which is, in fact, a 
question of the strategic timing of (foreign direct) investment, is the herd effect as explained 
very early by Knickerbocker (1973) whereby companies want a certain strategic balance to 
hold which urges them to follow the leader (Knickerbocker (1973» by matching the latter's 
investment. This herd effect is a concept in financial economics as well, where it is often 
explained as a way for managers to 'share the blame' in the case the investment project would 
not turn out to be so successful as expected. This effect drives managers to herd (Scharfstein, 
Stein (1990)). 
111.2.3. Strategic trade policy 
Another determining force on the decision for FDI is the future host government. Apart 
from its trade policy, one could analyse some other (dis)incentives given by the government. 
We believe, though, that we could, unlike but also in view of some other very elaborate studies 
with this different focus on (dis)incentives in the narrow sense (Guisinger, et al. (1985)) focus 
on non-government induced determinants of foreign direct investment. Given that our dataset 
will be focused on four countries, it would also not be interesting to merely compare four 
governmental policies, since it would not prove very much. 
Annabel Sels, research report, February 1996 
-17-
Concerning tariffs, a more recent finding by Motta (1992) is that there is no simple 
relationship between the cost variables of the MNE and of the local firm which is entering on 
the one hand and the 'direct investment versus export' choice by the MNE on the other. Motta 
proves the rather counterintuitive result that a tariff can induce the MNE to move away from 
FDI and export or else lead to tariff-jumping investment. He also comes to the conclusion that 
welfare increases by tariff-jumping if the local firm(s) would have entered the market if trade 
had been free. This latter situation might be aimed at by the strategic formulation of the trade 
policy by the host government, which is worth some exploration. We would rather start from 
the different alternatives a host government sees as choices for itself. We think also of a type 
of "most preferred partner" relationship which a particular firm or firms of a particular home 
country develop with some host government, which increases their bargaining power vis a vis 
investors of a different nationality. In Central and Eastern Europe local governments are 
expected to foster the privatisation process of companies which is a prerequisite for private 
investors taking shares. State aid is compared to opportunities elsewhere, es~ecially in Asia, 
beside efforts of improving the infrastructure, tax breaks and low-interest loans 8. 
Related to this, Norman, Motta (1993) developed an argument on the relationship 
between market integration in the CEECs and FDI in the same region. In the tradition of recent 
game theoretic models of FDI (Smith (1987), Motta (1992), among others), the authors 
conclude that market integration, beside transition (whereby the latter causes market size to 
grow) induces MNEs to switch from exporting to FDI as a strategy. There is no speedy 
integration of the Visegrad markets yet, but in 1992, with the establishment of CEFTA (the 
Central European Free Trade Association), an impetus was given which has resulted in the 
amount of 80% of the industrial goods being duty-free already. There is still some work to do 
in the field of agricultural duties, which the CEFTA member countries (the Czech and Slovak 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia by now) are not so keen on. The automotive industry, 
e.g., complains about strong market protectionism, which is a reason for high fluctuations in 
demand. Hungary introduced high import tariffs,.which was immediately reflected in new 
investments. Where Fiat bought more or less control of the Polish car market in 1992, 
followed by Daewoo and GM, the VW investment in the Czech Republic still accounts for 20% 
of total FDI in that country. In view of an abolition of protectionism by the CEECs' 
governments, assembly plants are of minor importance, as opposed to full manufacturing 
plants. This latter aspect is something important in real and temporary deterrence as well, 
since companies investing in the CEECs with a long time perspective are to be feared more 
by their competitors than those with a temporary presence in the region. 
111.2.4. Union-firm bargaining and delocalisation 
Another player beside the entering MNEs could be the union in the home or the host 
country. The union in the host country might collude with the host government to increase the 
forces which pull investments to the country, given that this enhances employment and 
welfare, possibly wages. What is traditionally not dealt with is the correlation between 
unemployment and the presence of MNEs. Beside there being little evidence of unions in the 
CEECs, although the companies have traditionally more labour participation, it might be more 
interesting to emphasise the other player, the union of the home country, in view of the 
delocalisation debate. 
This inclusion of the home country union leads to an analysis of the horizontal effects 
of an imperfect product market structure on FDI. There is a possibility of bargaining between 
the union of the investor country and a firm of this country to induce the firm to delocalise. This 
will make the income of the (remaining) workers of the plant in the country of origin higher. 
There is, however, always a trade-off between the negotiations on the wage and the level of 
employment in the case of a bargaining model. This indicates there are two different 
possibilities of rent sharing as well, according to whether the wage is in essence an 
efficiency wage or whether there exists wage bargaining. This again depends on the level of 
unionisation within the industry. Unlike efficiency wages, which are proved to create a unique 
18 This is a statement by F. Piech, chairman of the board of Volkswagen AG, one of the first big 
investors in the region, with projects in Slovakia (Golf, Passat, and transmissions) since 1991, Poland 
(VW transporters and Skoda cars) since 1993 and Hungary (engines for VW's lUXUry cars) since 1994. 
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downstream vertical spillover in the sense that an increase in unit wage costs is correlated 
with an increase in market share, the wage bargaining (also called ready-to-manage) model 
creates two-way spillovers between the product market and the labour market (Konings, 
Walsh (1994)). Whereas in the former case of efficiency wages, the positive rents will be 
reflected in higher wages as a kind of subsidy to the workers, the bargaining case means that 
rents go to the workers and they are a kind of tax to the union and the firm. 
Bughin, Vannini (1994) work with a bargaining model and a host instead of a home 
country union and include a local rival firm, unrelated to a specific stylised fact coming from 
practices in the CEECS19. They come to the following three conclusions. Union power tends to 
deter FDI, except if the degree of unionisation is partial (as opposed to full unionisation with 
(de)centralised bargaining). In the case of an endogenous bargaining structure, 
unemployment is not necessarily reduced under FDI. Finally, the host country firms and 
unions may agree on the bargaining structure and collusion among firms and unions may 
lead to FDI deterrence. If we would like to include a local rival firm in this type of analytical 
modelling, it might be interesting to allow for differentiated goods, whereby the MNE can be 
thought as, for example, the downward supplier of the local rival firm. Engines plants in the 
CEECs are very often delivering to the Western mother company which produces the final car. 
There is even some protest heard on investors who promised to create more value added in 
the CEECs than they finally did. Moreover local suppliers who expected to benefit from the 
establishment of a foreign investor nearby as a customer, were very disappointed when it 
turned out to be Western suppliers who delivered also over there. 
The typical application to FDI in the CEECs might reveal some regularities in the 
currently relaunched delocalisation debate, which is also present for the Far East and Latin 
America. 
111.2.5. Our research agenda: a tentative integrated model 
It would be ideal if one could combine these different models in one way or another. 
The basic work by Hirsch (1976) could be used as a starting point, because it has the 
advantage of being an integrated model whereby tariffs, transportation costs and both firm and 
plant specific sunk costs are the determinants of FDI by a MNE entering and seeing itself 
confronted with a local competitor who could also decide to enter the same product market. 
The interesting feature of this model is that it provides one with some inequalities which are 
decision rules as to when it is advisable for the MNE to export or to invest, given the action 
decided for by the local entrant. It analyses the entry by two firms, either simultaneously or 
sequentially, let it be that one is a multinational and the other one a local company, which 
differs from our interest. 
The production costs of producing in two countries are different. There is a difference 
between the export marketing costs per sales unit in the home country and the same cost if 
one decides to export abroad. The MNE possesses an intangible asset, which is, as a matter 
of fact, a barrier to entry (in Caves' terminology) or the ownership advantage (in Dunning's 
terminology) for the other potential entrant20 . The interesting feature about the intangible 
asset, in the way Hirsch defines it, is that it represents a sunk cost for the MNE, which might 
be split from production costs. Production can be undertaken in a country different from the 
country where the production takes place, because of lower production costs. Another aspect 
complicates things, which is the control cost of international production, which is a FDI 
deterring aspect for the MNE. This control cost favours production at the same site where 
development takes place, which is a counterforce to the previous sunk cost. The control cost 
is positively related to the intangible asset, alias the development cost. 
19 Vannini (1995), though, developed a model on FDI in transition economies as well, in which he 
shows that insufficient "marketisation" and regulation are major obstacles to FDI in that region. 
20In Hirsch' model the entrant is a local firm with the same production cost as the entering MNE, but, 
whereas the MNE has the intangible asset as a sunk cost, the local entrant must pay this firm specific 
know-how to let it become a proprietary asset. 
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The government of the host country could influence the decision by imposing a tariff, 
tax, of subsidy, and so can do the other country. As soon as one assumes, more realistically, 
a multi-product firm or the production of intermediate goods, the decision to invest is not to be 
considered as a decision not to export. In a multiproduct firm the investment abroad 
substantially reduces export marketing costs while non-exportable goods will be produced in 
the host country. Second, intermediate goods (parts, sub-assemblies, or semi-finished goods) 
which used to be non-exportable, become exportable because of the investment abroad. The 
control cost, which was positively correlated with the initial investment cost is reduced by the 
investment for later stages. The reduction of export marketing costs explains also defensive 
investment, such as suggested in the cluster effect, or call it the herd effect, where suppliers 
and customers imitate each other in investing abroad. 
Whether other investors will show up after a first mover invested is dependent on 
factors which need to be introduced into the model, which are : the expectations of a firm 
regarding its rival's behaviour, as analysed by Smith (1987) for the case of government 
intervention, the objectives of the firms, their costs and revenues and the heterogeneity and, 
maybe, demand elasticity of the product. 
If the costs of the two production sites (countries) are not the same, in terms of 
production costs, one can deduce the implications of the type of industry in which the 
investment will typically take place. The empirical work in Part II revealed already some very 
striking results as far as the industry distribution is concerned. In particular, industries where 
the intangible asset is important, which could be more or less a synonym of high-tech 
industries (Hymer's hypothesis !) are more inclined, in this reasoning, to invest abroad (cf. 
Vernon), for which Hymer and others cite some early empirical evidence, typically for 
American automobiles, tobacco, cosmetics, and tyres investment in Western Europe. This 
partially contrasts our empirical findings in the Eastern region of Europe, which is, in itself, 
already very interesting. The intangible asset is supposed to be firm and not country specific, 
though. 
It must be possible to adapt Hirsch' framework for at least two characteristics: a 
situation of two MNEs entering instead of a MNE and a local firm, and to work this out in a 
game, while at the same time necessarily allowing for uncertainty about the new 
environment. The waiting and learning modelling could provide ideas to model the 
uncertainty ensuing from the unfamiliar environment in which the entrant will need to operate 
in such a context as the historically planned economies, for example. This is in an embryonic 
way present in what Hirsch models as a cost due to adaptation to 'the way of doing business 
abroad' and the costs linked to this. The same information structure will also influence the 
typical strategic aspect of the investment, which means the degree to which the first mover 
really enjoys advantages. 
The union of the home country could meanwhile also influence this game, as far as 
the estimation of local production costs is concerned. This would be an integration of parts 
111.2.1-111.2.4. The investigation of this model will help us to formulate several hypotheses on 
the strategic content of foreign direct investment. 
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Conclusion 
Expectations were high when the iron Curtain fell with respect to foreign direct 
investments in the CEECs' (the Central and Eastern European countries) new market. 
Specialists in theorising on foreign direct investments overestimated the transfer of 
technology, management and marketing know-how which would ensue from the opening of 
the region and improve the production factors (Dunning (1993)). The initial optimism about the 
profitability of investment projects in Central and Eastern Europe seems to have been 
replaced by large uncertainty. The possible reasons for this hesitant attitude will be part of the 
core of our analysis. This analysis will deal with the theory of multinational corporations 
(MNEs) in general, and with the strategic aspects and management of uncertainty regarding 
their investments abroad in particular. Since the investments in the Visegrad countries are too 
(s)low, as confirmed by manager surveys on investment assessments (OECD, 1994), one 
needs to identify the reasons for the (lagging) investment behaviour. On top of this, the usual 
industry distribution of foreign direct investments is not put into evidence at all. On the 
contrary, the less traditional investor industries, but more local market oriented industries are 
seen to have invested the first and the most. 
Starting from this and other surprising evidence, the existing more recent theorising 
(Part 111.2.) on strategic behaviour by multinationals could be combined with an original 
approach to consider the trade-off that potential investors are confronted with between 
investing now or waiting and learning from other investors, possibly by exporting now and 
investing later or never. The relationship to or competition with the potential rivals who are also 
interested in entering, with the union in the home country which fights for its employment 
and/or wages and with the host government with its trade policy is due to playa part as well. 
By empirically testing the model(s) studied and the ones adapted, deduction from theory and 
induction from the empirical model could be combined. 
Knowledge about the strategic interaction which determines capital flows should also 
shed some light on the role this foreign direct investment could play in the structural 
adjustment process of the Central and Eastern European countries and in the possible 
integration of these countries as members of the European Union, which is also a final 
research aim of ours. The Hungarian-American financier George Soros, who undertook very 
massive projects in the form of the so-called "Open Society Foundations", which foster Europe 
as an open society instead of a centralised democracy being responsible to 15 member states 
only, is very disappointed by "the ideology of national self-interest" which governs Europe (the 
EU is meant). The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe should have revived 
the idea of a open Europe, according to this since 1986 perhaps world's most active 
philanthropist active in the Eastern region of Europe. 
It will be impossible to produce an all-embracing theory in the parallel consideration of 
the different players which influence and interact with the strategic behaviour of the 
multinationals in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, but we would try to put some 
consistent results into perspective. . 
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APPENDIX 
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Table 1 - FOI in mio OM 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia TOTAL CEE 
1986 35 
1987 21 
1988 25 26 
1989 321 404 21 162 
1990 6 333 570 143 180 85 1319 
1991 92 990 2412 480 66 135 68 4244 
1992 66 1721 2307 1058 120 112 173 5557 
1993 91 792 3878 2830 155 198 7943 
1994* 555 648 2586 2268 1134 299 7490 
(in %) 
1990 0,49% 25,27% 43,22% 10,87% 13,68% 6,47% 100,00% 
1991 2,18% 23,33% 56,84% 11,31% 1,56% 3,19% 1,59% 100,00% 
1992 1,18% 30,97% 41,52% 19,03% 2,16% 2,02% 3,12% 100,00% 
1993 1,14% 9,97% 48,82% 35,63% 1,95% 2,49% 100,00% 
1994* 7,42% 8,65% 34,52% 30,28% 15,14% 4,00% 100,00% 
Republic: PlanEcon, March 1995 and Deutsche Bank Research, 1995 (latter figures differ slightly from those of the IMF 
published in the IFS) 
• as the figures for 1994 are not taken from the same sources, they must be seen as estimates 
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Figure 2: Composition of the foreign capital inflow into the Czech Republic (1992-1994) 
1993 1994 
source: Czech National Bank 
13 direct credits to companies 
III portfolio investments 
~ direct foreign investments 
~ bonds of public sector, central bank 
I:] official borrowings 
Table 2 - Distribution of FDI 
[;U-c.~ kJtA,l;c Hbllgc-ry PF)I.ru.~ V-J 
Belgium 1990 2% 64% 34% 100% 
1991 34% 59% 7% 100% 
1992 29% 56% 14% 100% 
1993 1% 54% 44% 100% 
1994 27% 22% 51% 100% 
average share 19% 51% 30% 100% 
Austria 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 25% 70% 4% 100% 
1993 42% 56% 2% 100% 
1994 47% 47% 5% 100% 
average share 38% 58% 4% 100% 
Netherlands 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 7% 54% 39% 100% 
1992 45% 46% 9% 100% 
1993 49% 27% 24% 100% 
1994 10% 34% 56% 100% 
average share 28% 40% 32% 100% 
Japan 1990 0% 91% 9% 100% 
1991 0% 99% 1% 100% 
1992 47% 47% 6% 100% 
1993 0% 91% 9% 100% 
1994 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
average share 12% 82% 6% 100% 
Denmark 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 12% 44% 44% 100% 
1993 30% 35% 35% 100% 
1994 19% 40% 40% 100% 
average share 20% 40% 40% 100% 
Italy 1990 32% 62% 6% 100% 
1991 68% 29% 4% 100% 
1992 39% 39% 21% 100% 
1993 3% 14% 83% 100% 
1994 15% 37% 48% 100% 
average share 31% 36% 32% 100% 
Switzerland 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993 1% 47% 52% 100% 
1994 0,05% 75% 25% 100% 
average share 0,35% 61,17% 38,48% 100,00% 
Finland 1990 0% 83% 17% 100% 
1991 0% 62% 38% 100% 
1992 4% 65% 31% 100% 
1993 2% 60% 38% 100% 
1994 1% 49% 50% 100% 
average share 2% 64% 35% 100% 
Table 2 - Distribution of FDI 
Spain 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993 0% 50% 50% 100% 
1994 0% 50% 50% 100% 
average share 0% 50% 50% 100% 
Germany 1990 1% 95% 4% 100% 
1991 60% 35% 5% 100% 
1992 35% 55% 10% 100% 
1993 31% 47% 22% 100% 
1994 50% 31% 20% 100% 
average share 35% 53% 12% 100% 
USA 1990 0% 99% 1% 100% 
1991 0% 86% 14% 100% 
1992 25% 34% 40% 100% 
1993 2% 79% 19% 100% 
1994 27% 42% 32% 100% 
average share 11% 68% 21% 100% 
UK 1990 0% 0% 100% 100% 
1991 3% 78% 19% 100% 
1992 12% 78% 10% 100% 
1993 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1994 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
average share 5% 52% 43% 100% 
source: balance of payments data from the respective National Banks 
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Figure 4 and Table 3 - Industry 
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Figure 5 : Investment (in DM) according to a classification of advertising and R&D intensity 
(classification by Lyons, 1995) 
(sample of 420 major investors in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 1990-June 1995) 
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Figure 7 : Total investments according to industry 
(sample of 420 major investors in the Vise grad countries) 
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Figure 9 : Total investments per industry (in DM) 
(sample of 420 major investors in the Visegrad countries) 
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